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). Yet cognitive ability and financial literacy can also affect the decision to delegate, since delegation requires a complicated process of acquiring, screening, and monitoring information about financial advisors and their services. Moreover, there is still no consensus on the impact of cognitive ability and financial literacy on the demand for financial advice at older ages. Accordingly, to evaluate whether cognitive ability and financial literacy have a protective role helping older people make better decisions about when to seek -or avoid -financial advice, we designed a purpose-built experimental module and fielded it in the 2016 Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Here we asked people age 50+ several questions about whether they had obtained financial advice, and if so, which types of advice they sought. For those who did not access financial advice, we also asked them why they had not. To this module, we link a rich array of information from the core HRS including cognitive ability scores, financial literacy scores, sociodemographic factors, wealth, and health. Using a novel instrumental variable (IV) approach, we trace the causal impacts of cognitive ability and financial literacy on older peoples' financial behavior focusing on their demand for financial advice.
Our results show that cognitive ability and financial literacy affect the quality, but not the quantity, of financial advice that older persons seek out. Specifically, cognitive ability and financial literacy do not affect the likelihood of seeking financial advice, but they do influence the types of financial advice people to receive. More cognitively able and financially literate individuals are more likely to obtain financial advice from professional advisors and they are more likely to receive 'free' financial consultations with commission-based payments to professional advisors. This result is consistent with Inderst and Ottaviani's (2012a) theoretical prediction that sophisticated consumers understand that commission-based payments can be an effective way to induce advisors to learn about financial products suitable for their customers. The economic significance of our results is also sizable: for instance, in our preferred IV specification, one standard deviation improvement in cognitive ability leads to a 11.8 percent greater chance of seeking professional financial advice, and a 14.7 percent higher chance of having obtained 'free' advice. One standard deviation higher financial literacy score boosts the probability of obtaining professional financial advice by 6.5 percent.
Because only around one-third (35 percent) of our older respondents indicated that they ever sought financial advice, we also asked the others why they did not. Responses indicate that more cognitively able respondents lack trust in financial advisors: a cognition score one standard deviation higher is associated with a 30.8 percent greater chance of distrusting financial advisors. Accordingly, cognitive ability plays an important role in determining who trusts financial advisors, and trust is a significant predictor of the demand for financial advice (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2015) .
Our analysis offers potential lessons for policymakers. For instance, Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) predict that commission-based advice can be welfare-enhancing for investors who understand advisors' potential conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, they also note that advisors paid via commissions could also exploit naïve investors who believe that the advice provided is unbiased. Our empirical results show that people with high cognitive ability do utilize the free consultations, and therefore have policy implications for financial consumer protection: scrapping commission-based payment would not necessarily increase consumer welfare. Mandating fee disclosure would be likely to help protect cognitively impaired investors, while commission-based payments would help sophisticated investors obtain low-cost financial help.
In what follows, we first briefly summarize prior research on financial management patterns in later life. Next, we discuss anticipated hypotheses linking cognitive ability, financial literacy, and the demand for financial advice. Following a discussion of empirical results using our HRS module, a final section concludes.
Related Studies and Hypothesis Development
Three related threads in the literature are relevant to our research: (1) studies on investors' limited attention; (2) analyses of financial illiteracy; and (3) inquiries into the complex institutional environment confronting older persons when they make financial decisions. We touch on each, in turn.
In the context of a life-cycle model with stochastic labor income and endogenous work effort, Kim, Maurer, and Mitchell (2016, 2017) showed that, early in life, individuals deriving utility from consumption and leisure will rationally devote little or no attention to their retirement portfolios.
1 This is because managing a portfolio consumes mental resources, and devoting time to the task imposes an opportunity cost -employees lose the chance to invest in job-specific human capital. When people managing their own investments must do so at the expense of future labor income growth, they would benefit from hiring financial advisors so as to decrease the costs of managing their own finances. Naturally, delegating one's investments to an advisor also entails a monetary cost, so this tradeoff must be dynamically re-evaluated over the life cycle. Young workers have little wealth, yet they have the longest time horizon over which to reap the rewards of sound financial advice. Older individuals may value input from financial advisors to the extent that they experience declining mental faculties, making it more challenging to do the job on their own.
A second reason that older people may seek financial advice is that many of them are financially illiterate, leading them to undersave and underinvest (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014; Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell, 2017; Clark, Lusardi, and Mitchell, 2015; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2011; Choi, 2015) . Many older adults make mistakes when managing their finances in both developed and developing countries (e.g., Badarinza, Campbell, and Ramadorai, 2016; Badarinza, Balasubramaniam, and Ramadorai, 2019) . Somewhat surprisingly, and despite objective confirmation of an age-linked decline in financial capability at older ages, the evidence shows that older persons' self-confidence in their own financial ability rises with age, peaking at about age 88. 2 To this point, there is now a growing literature on the consequences of poor financial capability in later life (Agarwal et al., 2009) . For instance, the FINRA Investor Education
Foundation (2013) found that over 80 percent of adults of all ages had been solicited for potentially fraudulent offers, while older Americans were the most likely targets and most likely to lose money when targeted (DeLiema and Deevy, 2017) . Even worse, education has only a limited role in protecting older peoples' financial management capabilities (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2005; Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer, 2014) .
A third reason that older persons may seek financial advice is that institutional complexity bedevils the decisions people must confront when planning for, making provision for, and moving into retirement. In the US, for instance, rules regarding when to claim one's Social Security benefits are extremely complicated, particularly if one has a spouse who is also entitled (or will be entitled)
to Social Security benefits (Kotlikoff, Moeller, and Solman, 2016) . There are also numerous and quite complex regulations regarding how much people may save in tax-qualified retirement savings accounts, when someone can make penalty-free payouts, and when an individual must begin taking required minimum distributions from these accounts (Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell, 2016) . These realities become particularly challenging when cognitive ability declines with age. Therefore, complex financial products and services can present an obstacle to sound financial outcomes when older adults' cognitive ability declines (Agarwal and Mazumder, 2013 and Rabin, 1999) , and for those who distrust or cannot evaluate advice (Gino, 2008; Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a; Agnew et al., 2018) . 4 To date, however, no empirical analysis has linked older persons' demand for financial advice with cognitive ability and financial literacy, as we do here.
There are several possible links between cognitive ability, financial literacy, and the probability of seeking financial advice at older ages, as well as the type of advice sought. What we seek to determine is whether older people suffering from cognitive shortfalls are more or less likely to seek financial advice. The anticipated directionality could be either positive or negative. If cognitive ability and financial literacy effectively reduce peoples' time cost associated with managing their own financial tasks (Kim, Maurer, and Mitchell, 2016) , older people with high cognitive ability and financial literacy will need less financial advice. Nevertheless, screening and monitoring financial advisors also require consumers to expend cognitive and financial resources, so cognitive ability and financial literacy can boost the demand for financial advisory services. In addition, some older investors would rationally delegate managing their finances to others when they recognize that their ability to manage finances has declined. Of course, others, mistakenly believing that their acumen remains intact, might retain these management tasks without asking for help. In other words, the net impact of the link remains to be established empirically.
As a null hypothesis, we posit that the two opposing effects of cognitive ability and financial literacy on the demand for financial advice might offset each other:
Hypothesis 1 (Likelihood of seeking financial advice): Cognitive ability and financial literacy will not be significantly related to the likelihood of seeking financial advice.
If this null hypothesis is rejected and the estimated impact is positive (negative, respectively), this would imply that the positive (negative, respectively) impact of cognitive ability and financial literacy on the demand for financial advice dominates.
Hypothesis 1 focuses on the quantity of financial advice sought by older adults, yet customer sophistication can also affect the quality of advice. All financial advice does not require the same levels of sophistication and knowledge. For example, receiving help from professional advisors requires more sophistication on the customer's side than does getting help with simple money management tasks from family members (e.g., bill payment). Receiving high-quality but potentially biased advice from professional financial advisors using a commission-based payment structure requires fairly sophisticated consumers: thus Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) predicted that unsophisticated consumers will not fully incorporate potential conflicts of interest due to commission-based fees when they assess the quality of financial advice received. By contrast, they indicated that sophisticated customers may understand that commission-based fees can be an effective incentive to get advisers to learn about the suitability of complex financial products for their customers' needs. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2 (Quality of financial advice received): Among those receiving financial advice, greater cognitive ability and financial literacy will increase the likelihood of seeking financial advice from professionals.
A natural corollary of Hypothesis 2 is that people with high cognitive ability and financial literacy would be able to utilize the 'free' professional consultation as an effective incentive tool, even though it also embodies potential conflicts of interest. Accordingly, testing Hypothesis 2 offers insights relevant to policymakers and financial advisory service providers. For instance, if older persons of low cognitive ability and financial literacy seek advice that is conflicted, policymakers may believe it necessary to devise mechanisms to protect them from potentially exploitive services.
Methodology and Data
We designed and fielded an experimental module in the 2016 HRS to explore how people age 50+ manage their financial affairs. 5 This pilot module, assigned randomly, has a smaller sample than the core HRS modules by construction; it consists of 1,594 age-eligible respondents (age 50+) who responded to our questions on their financial behaviors. 6 Specifically, we asked respondents whether they received any type of financial advice, and if so, what types of financial advice they received and from whom. Additionally, we asked persons who did not seek financial advice why they did not (see Appendix 1 for details). Accordingly, sample sizes for our financial behavior questions differ depending on how respondents answered precursor questions.
Summary statistics on our financial behavior variables and several controls gathered from other core HRS surveys appear in Table 1 (pairwise correlations of variables are shown in Appendix 2). Responses to the first Module question shows that only one-third (35 percent) of the age 50+ respondents indicated that they received advice on money management (Get help w/money mgmt). Of those who did, half received advice on investments (Help w/invst), and a large majority (74 percent) of those sought help from a professional outside of their family/friends network. A sizeable fraction (13 percent) said they received 'free' professional advice, which of course is unlikely to be completely free as commissions or fees are embedded in the products purchased.
Focusing on respondents who sought no financial advice, 51 percent said they were confident enough to manage the money on their own (No money help: Self-confidence); 3 percent indicated they did not trust advisors (No money help: Distrust); and 3 percent indicated they did not know whom to ask (No money help: DK whom to ask). of respondents are married. Average education is 13.6 years, and respondents hold an average of net non-housing wealth of about $136,000, and housing net wealth of $157,000.
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Empirical Analysis
To evaluate how financial behaviors of interest relate to respondents' cognitive ability and financial literacy holding other factors constant, we estimate multivariate Probit models of the following form: It is possible that estimates of equation (1) A potential concern regarding the exclusion restriction is that Vision Problem and Economics class might also affect the demand for financial advice, in that people in better health and who hold more (or less) wealth would seek out advice. To protect against this possibility, our empirical models also hold constant the respondent's health and housing/non-housing wealth. After controlling for possible alternative channels through which the IVs affect the demand for financial advice, we believe that these variables satisfy the exclusion restriction conditions necessary for instrumental variables. Below we present both OLS and IV results of our two key variables on financial behaviors of interest. Table 2 reports the factors associated with seeking financial advice as well as the types of advice that respondents indicated they received. In each case, we report marginal effects from the Probit and IV Probit regressions to facilitate a comparison of the impact of addressing endogeneity concerns. Columns 1-2 of this table indicate that Cognition and FinLit are unrelated to the take-up of financial advice in both the OLS and IV models. Accordingly, the unconditional probability of receiving any financial advice is unaffected by cognitive ability or financial literacy, holding other factors constant. Even for those who do receive financial advice, Cognition scores and FinLit scores are uncorrelated with the probability of receiving financial advice regarding sophisticated financial topics such as investments (Column 3). Additionally, the IV analysis (Column 4) confirms that, for those who do seek financial advice, the probability of receiving more sophisticated financial advice (e.g., about investments) is not statistically significantly associated with Cognition score and FinLit score. Overall, our results in columns 1-4 do not reject the null hypothesis that cognitive ability and financial literacy are unrelated to the quantity of financial advice people receive (Hypothesis 1). Other results in Table 2 are also worth noting. Better-educated respondents are more likely to receive financial advice in the OLS equation (Column 1), but the result is attenuated in the IV analysis (Column 2). The IV analysis shows that better-educated people also tend to seek advice from professional advisors (Column 6) and are less likely to get free consulting (Column 8). People with more housing wealth are more likely to receive financial advice on investment (Column 3) but this becomes insignificant in the IV analysis (Column 4). Older people are less likely to receive professional financial advice (Column6), but more 'free' help (Column 8). Taken as a whole, then, Table 2 suggests that cognitively able and financially literate respondents seek professional advice rather resorting to casual or informal help. Since cognitive ability and financial literacy do not affect the likelihood of seeking financial advice based on the IV analysis, we conclude that cognitive ability and financial literacy determine the quality rather than the quantity of financial advice sought.
Why Does Not Seek Financial Advice?
Two-thirds of the older HRS respondents reported that they did not seek financial advice, leading us to ask why. Table 3 presents marginal effects from Probit and IV Probit models of reasons people give for not receiving financial advice, where we link these to Cognition and FinLit scores as well as self-confidence, distrust, and lack of knowledge as potential explanations. Column 1 reports marginal effects from Probit models of self-confidence, where we see that people scoring poor on Cognition believe they can handle their financial management duties without others' help.
Interestingly, this result is again attenuated in the IV models (Column 2). The FinLit score is positively correlated with self-confidence, but this relation is not statistically significant. In other words, we find little evidence that Cognition and FinLit scores are related to self-confidence.
Table 3 here
Another potential reason for not receiving financial advice could be distrust of financial advisors (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2015) . Columns 3-4 of Table 3 present marginal effects from Probit and IV Probit models regressing Distrust on Cognition and FinLit as well as other controls. The IV Probit model, in which we place more confidence, indicates that more cognitively able persons tend to select the distrust issue as a reason for not seeking financial advice. One standard deviation higher Cognition score is associated with a 30.8 percent greater (=0.002×4.61/0.03) chance of stating that distrust is the reason for not seeking financial advice.
FinLit is not statistically significantly related to this outcome. Table 3 also shows results from Probit and IV Probit regressions of "Do not know whom to ask" on Cognition and FinLit as well as the other controls. The Probit and IV Probit (Columns 5-6) show that Cognition and FinLit scores are not tightly related to the lack of knowledge about whom to ask for financial advice. In the IV Probit estimation, few of the control variables are related to self-confidence and lack of knowledge. One that does stand out appears in Column (4), where older non-white men with less education are more likely to indicate distrust as a reason for not receiving financial advice.
Overall, Table 3 indicates that cognitive ability is an important factor associated with older people's trust in financial advisors. Specifically, more cognitively able individuals tend to report that they do not seek financial advice due to distrust. Combined with our earlier results showing that cognitive ability encourages 'free' financial consultation, Table 3 implies that older people who maintain high cognitive ability have a more cautious attitude toward receiving financial advice that may embody potential conflicts of interests. Financial literacy plays a less important role.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has explored the impact of two important factors driving the demand for financial advice in an aging population: cognitive ability and financial literacy. Given increasingly complex financial products and the disintermediation of retirement decisions, many older persons with substantial savings may not be able to manage financial tasks on their own, so it is important to understand how they hire financial advisors. We find that cognitive ability and financial literacy both help shape the quality, but not the quantity, of financial advice sought by older persons. While cognitive ability and financial literacy scores are not significantly related to the probability of seeking financial advice, being more cognitively able and financially literate does enhance the chance that older people seek advice from more sophisticated sources, such as professional advisors. This could be because they understand potential conflict of interests embedded in professional advisors' recommendations, yet they understand that professional advisors will seek suitable financial products for their customers' needs (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a) . Our IV analysis implies that a standard deviation increase in cognitive ability and financial literacy increases the chances of seeking financial advice from professionals, rather than family members, by 11.8 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. We also find that more cognitively able respondents tend to distrust financial advisors, suggesting that cognitive ability may protect them from potentially deceptive financial advice practices.
The fact that both cognitive ability and financial literacy help shape the quality of financial advice sought implies that the mere existence of financial advisors will not, on its own, correct suboptimal financial practices by some older households. Our work shows that low cognitive ability and poor financial literacy can be a barrier to receiving quality financial advice, implying that researchers and policymakers may need to find new ways to evaluate and monitor financial behavior for an aging population. Financial institutions are likely to find it useful to enhance protections for their older customers; efforts along these lines include a program teaching bank tellers how to recognize when customers show signs of declining mental capacity or are being financially exploited (Gunther, 2015) . Various federal agencies also handle complaints regarding financial fraud, and some states have passed laws seeking to protect elders from financial exploitation, for instance, allowing triple damages for victims winning legal cases against their perpetrators (DeLiema and Deevy, 2017 
